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Out with the Old and in with the New: Bringing the Law of Domicile into the Twenty First Century  
 




Domicile is the preferred connecting factor in matters of personal status within the law of England 
and Wales particularly within family law, yet it is a concept that has been neglected for several years. 
While the Law Commission proposed reform over thirty years ago, the requisite developments never 
ensued. Meanwhile, society and other aspects of the law continued to evolve, adding to the already 
problematic area. This is particularly apparent when assessing the domicile of a child with same-sex 
parents. The current provisions assign a child’s domicile based on the gendered roles of mother and 
father dependent upon the child’s legitimacy, which, assumes that all children have parents of the 
opposite sex. This outdated approach means that a child of a same-sex couple has no way of 
ascertaining where they are domiciled. In proposing a holistic reform of the law on domicile, this 
author utilises the developments around same-sex relationships not previously discussed in the 
literature on domicile, to reignite the debate on domicile reform. With a focus on modern society this 
article considers the faults with the current common law concept of domicile, proposes policy 
sensitive reform, and considers habitual residence and nationality as an alternative, before concluding 




As the preferred connecting factor in matters of personal status within the law of England and Wales1, 
domicile plays a vital role within areas such as; succession, taxation, jurisdiction in divorce proceedings 
and marriage validity. Regardless of this pivotal role within various aspects of the law, it is a concept 
that despite long-term criticism,2 remains unchanged for many years. Amidst the criticism, there have 
been various calls for reform from academics and the Law Commission3, but, as recognised by 
McEleavy, the response to the Law Commission reports demonstrate that political will for reform has 
been lacking,4 and it has become somewhat of a forgotten area. This author however, asserts that 
modern developments within family life and family law make reform of the law on domicile a 
necessity.  With the ability for same-sex couples to marry now, the law on domicile fails to provide 
appropriate rules for children of such couples. Likewise, the concept of the nuclear family has changed 
dramatically, as the way people choose to live their family life has evolved and so the rules as they 
                                                            
1 Hereafter referred to as England. 
2 Such criticism can be evidenced by the calls for reform dating as far back as 1954 in Private International Law 
Committee, First Report of the Private International Law Committee (Cmd. 9068, 1954). Reform advised again 
by the Law Commission in Law Commission, Private International Law the Law of Domicile Law Com No 88 
(1985). In addition, academics such as Carter (PB Carter, ‘Domicile: The Case For Radical reform in The United 
Kingdom’ (1987) 36 ICLQ 713) have also criticised the law in the area.  
3 Law Commission, Private International Law the Law of Domicile Law Com No 88 (1985). 
4 P McEleavy, ‘Regression and Reform in the Law on Domicile’ (2007) 56(2) ICLQ 453, 462. 
stand do not always provide predictability and certainty for parties, nor meet their expectations when 
connecting them to a country.  
In accordance with the common law rules on domicile, there are three types of domicile; domicile of 
origin, domicile of choice and domicile of dependency. However, despite there being three, a 
propositus can never have more than one domicile for a particular purpose, nor can they be without 
one. For matters of personal status it is important that a person’s domicile is able to be determined 
at any given time, but problems with the law on domicile means that making such a determination 
may not be straightforward as a consequence of outdated rules to assign a domicile of origin, 
primordial importance attached to the domicile of origin through the doctrine of revival, and 
difficulties in assessing if, and at what point, a domicile of choice is acquired.  Though many of these 
problems were identified many years ago, society’s continued development and increased migration 
means that for policy reasons around certainty and party expectations reform is long overdue. In 
addition, this author considers that the problems faced by children of same-sex couples in ascertaining 
their domicile due to the gender based rules, poignantly demonstrates that developments now make 
reform a necessity. With the inability for a particular group of persons to ascertain their domicile, it 
could be considered an issue under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as 
a consequence of the role domicile plays within private life in England. This, and the resulting potential 
for a breach of Convention rights under Article 8 and 14, are, therefore, argued to be a catalyst for re-
examining the law through a modern public policy lense.   
This article analyses the law on domicile, before proposing appropriate reform. This analysis will, in 
addition to building on previously recognised areas of concern, discuss the impact of modern legal 
development on the area to provide a level of originality to this discussion. Then, in seeking to add to 
the literature on this area, this piece will consider whether habitual residence or nationality ought to 
be considered as a replacement for domicile in England, to ensure the need for any proposed reform. 
Consideration is also given to policy objectives around certainty and party expectations throughout 
the article, in a bid to ensure that modern life, and the more migrant nature of society, is not forgotten, 
whilst adding a further dimension to the overarching analysis. 
 
II. Allocation of the Domicile of Origin 
 
A domicile of origin is acquired at birth, and is based on the domicile of the mother or father at that 
time, depending upon the child’s status of legitimacy. The status of legitimate or illegitimate is now 
largely redundant within law, but is still significant within the law on domicile, and could be considered 
an early indicator of the outdatedness of the law on domicile. If the child is legitimate it will take the 
father’s domicile at that time, and if illegitimate the domicile of the mother.5 While on the surface this 
may appear relatively uncomplicated, it does in fact raise problems. These rules may contrast with the 
way in which a child’s domicile of dependency may be assigned, depending upon the family’s living 
arrangements, such rules around dependency will be discussed later, but it is important to note that 
this could result in the domicile of origin being immediately replaced with a domicile of dependency, 
which raises questions around the purpose of the domicile of origin, which will be looked at in further 
detail later.  The rules assume that the couple are of the opposite sex, and makes no provision for the 
determination of the domicile of origin in instances where, for example a same-sex couple have 
                                                            
5 Udny v Udny (1869) LR 1 SC & Div 441, 457. 
adopted a child, or where a child is born to a woman who is either party to a same-sex marriage or a 
civil partnership.6 In both of these situations, the child is regarded as a legitimate child of that couple,7 
but the outdated rules  set out above in relation to the domicile of origin, that assume a child will have 
a mother and a father, provide no answers on how the domicile of origin would be determined. In 
addition to the outdatedness of such a provision, it can cause wider, and more ongoing issues. It leaves 
a child of a same-sex couple unable to determine their domicile of origin. For example, if we consider 
a child who is born to a woman in a same-sex marriage, that child will, as mentioned, be considered a 
legitimate child. Under the current rules for determining the domicile of origin, the domicile would 
follow that of their father at the time of the child’s birth, which, in the given scenario is not applicable, 
and leaves no appropriate method of determining the child’s domicile of origin. Where children are 
part of a same-sex family, the reference to one’s ‘mother’ and ‘father’ does not provide for, or 
incorporate their family unit. The law, as it stands discriminates against them as a class of people and 
violates Convention rights. Article 14 of the ECHR prohibits discrimination in the application of human 
rights on various grounds, some of which are enumerated within Article 14 itself, whilst many fall 
under the ‘other status’ banner. In suggesting that the current legal position of the domicile of origin 
is discriminatory and a breach of human rights in an effort to insight change, it is important to note 
that Article 14 is not a free standing right to non-discrimination, and its need to be used alongside one 
of the other Articles of the Convention. This is often referred to as the ‘ambit requirement’, 8  as it is 
sufficient to demonstrate that the facts of the case fall within the ambit of one of the Convention 
rights. 9   
When looking at the failure to provide rules to ascertain a child’s domicile it is argued that this could 
fall within the ‘private life’ aspect of Article 8. In the case of Geneovese v Malta,10 a child who had 
been born out of wedlock sought Maltese citizenship that he had been denied as a consequence of 
the non-marriage of his parents despite his father being Maltese. The court held that, ‘citizenship’ 
could fall within the ambit of Article 8, allowing the applicant to utilise Article 14 on the basis of 
discrimination of his status in the denial of issuing him citizenship. Though Article 8 does not guarantee 
a person the right to acquire citizenship in a particular place, previous case law has demonstrated that 
the denial may raise issues within Article 8:  
Although right to a citizenship is not as such guaranteed by the Convention or its protocols … 
the court does not exclude that an arbitrary denial of citizenship might in certain 
circumstances raise an issue under Article 8 of the Convention because of the impact of such 
a denial on the private life of the individual.11  
This same logic was used in Genovese v Malta, where the court recognised that while the denial of 
citizenship did not in itself result in a breach of Article 8, ‘its impact on the applicant’s social identity  
was such as to bring it within the general scope and ambit of that Article.’12 This is as a result of the 
                                                            
6 J Hill & M Ni Shuilleabhain, Clarkson & Hill’s Conflict of Laws (Oxford University Press, 5th Edn, 2016) 321. 
7 S.67(2) Adoption and Children Act 2002 provides that an adopted person is the legitimate child of the 
adopters if they are adopted by a couple. Likewise s.42 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 sets out 
that a civil partner or female spouse of a woman giving birth to a child is deemed to be the child’s parent, 
provided they were married or in the civil partnership at the time of insemination. Under s.48(b) such child ‘is 
the legitimate child of a child’s parents.’ 
8 R O’Connell, ‘Cinderella Comes to the Ball: Art 14 and the Right to Non-Discrimination in the ECHR’ (2009) 
29(2) LS 211, 215. 
9 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v UK (1985) 7 EHRR 471 [71]. 
10 (2014) 58 EHRR 25 
11 Karassev and Family v Finland (1999) 28 EHRR CD 132. 
12 Genovese v Malta (2014) 58 EHRR 25, [43]. 
court’s recognition that ‘private life’ can incorporate a person’s social identity. This author raises the 
same argument in relation to domicile. The arbitrary discrimination faced by children of same-sex 
couples who are unable to ascertain their domicile of origin could fall within the ‘private life’ aspect 
of Article 8. England primarily uses domicile as the connecting factor when dealing with personal 
status, and it therefore plays an important role within social identity. Indeed, Jonathan Hill and Máire 
Ni Shúilleabháin refer to connecting factors as being about a test of ‘belonging’ and acknowledge that 
in England and most common law countries, that connecting factor is domicile,13 meanwhile 
recognising that in civil law systems like Continental Europe that connecting factor is often 
nationality.14  
This assimilation of domicile in common law countries with citizenship or nationality in civil law 
countries, so as to extend the argument of breach of human rights to domicile is furthered by looking 
at Kerry Abrams’ works. Like England, as a common law country, the US also utilises domicile as a key 
connecting factor and Abrams states that ‘Domicile is a form of state citizenship’,15 furthermore, in 
analysing the previous stance around a married woman’s domicile being dependent upon her 
husband, she states that ‘a married woman’s citizenship followed her husband’s under the rule of 
“derivative domicile”.’16 Abrams’ interchanging use of ‘citizenship’ and ‘domicile’ is a consequence of 
the parallel role domicile plays within a person’s social identity, that nationality or citizenship plays 
within civil law countries. Thus, alongside Hill and Ni Shúilleabháin’s distinction between civil law and 
common law countries approach to connecting factors, it supports the argument that if matters of 
citizenship can fall within the ambit of Article 8 in relation to civil law countries like Malta in the case 
of Genovese, so can domicile for common law ECHR contracting countries like England. 
Upon falling within the ambit of Article 8, it could be determined that there is a breach of human rights 
when Article 14 is read in conjunction with Article 8. Article 14 ‘is an “autonomous” provision [that] 
can be violated even where the substantive Article relied upon to invoke Art 14 has not been 
violated.’17 Consequently, It need only be shown that the situation would fall within one of the grounds 
covered by Article 14. The current law fails to provide rules to allow the domicile of children of same-
sex couples to be determined, thus the status in question is children of same-sex couples. While this 
is not a status listed within Article 14, it is apparent from ‘any other status’ that the list is open-ended, 
and various statuses have become apparent throughout case law.18 Although at present there is no 
case law supporting such a status under Article 14, it is often widely interpreted by the European Court 
of Human Rights, and it appears ‘that almost any distinction within the ambit of a Convention right 
can trigger an Article 14 inquiry.’19 With examples of free masons and other non-secret 
organisations,20 and different types of fathers21 it is submitted that it is interpreted widely enough to 
include children of same-sex couples.  
Discrimination only occurs when there is no objective and reasonable justification.22 The non-provision 
of rules to determine the domicile of children of same-sex couples is arbitrary, with no reason other 
                                                            
13 Hill & Ni Shúilleabháin (n 6) above 316. 
14 Ibid 339. 
15 K Abrams, ‘Citizen Spouse’ (2013) 101(2) California Law Review 407, 413. 
16 Ibid 408, italics added for emphasis.  
17 O’Connell (n 8) above 215. 
18 For instance, JM v UK (2011) 53 EHRR 6 demonstrates sexual orientation would fall under this heading, as 
would health as seen in VAM V Serbia (Application No 39177/05) 13 March 2007. 
19 O’Connell (n 8) above 222. 
20 Grande Oriente d’Italia di Palazzo Giustiniani v Italy (Application No 26740/02) 31 May 2007. 
21 Paulik v Slovakia (2008) 46 EHRR 10. 
22 See (n 12) above [43]. 
than the law’s failure to keep up with other legal and societal developments, making it apparent that 
there is no objective or reasonable justification for the difference in treatment between them and 
children of heterosexual couples. With no such justification, upon falling within the ambit of Article 8, 
the current position could be deemed discriminatory against a relevant class of persons under Article 
14, leading to a breach of Convention rights. With this in mind, it is evident that the law surrounding 
the domicile of origin is in need of reform to reflect modern society and ensure that the domicile of 
all children is able to be ascertained. This is particularly imperative because currently, as a 
consequence of the doctrine of revival, a person’s domicile of origin can, even when replaced by a 
domicile of choice, resurface later in life. The use of domicile as a connecting factor in areas such as 
marriage validity and succession means that the problems outlined above may cause uncertainty for 
people, and lead to a loss of rights unexpectedly and unknowingly later in life when their unknown 
domicile of origin revives. The doctrine of revival and its associated problems will be analysed in the 
next section, however, exploration of the domicile of origin in itself demonstrates that the law 
surrounding the domicile of origin is no longer fit for purpose, and should be the catalyst not only to 
reform the domicile of origin but for a holistic reformulation of the law on domicile. In addition to the 
well documented problems with the law within the domicile of origin,23 as propounded herein, there 
should be a clarion call for reform, primordially identifying the impact the current rules may have on 
the many same-sex couples and their children in today’s society.    
 
III. Doctrine of Revival 
 
The doctrine of revival means that whenever a domicile of choice is abandoned the domicile of origin 
steps back into place until a new domicile of choice is acquired.24 It ensures that a propositus is never 
without a domicile by acting as a stop gap while another domicile of choice is ascertained. However, 
despite fulfilling the requirement that a person is never left without a domicile, it is a concept that has 
been criticised: ‘The doctrine of revival of the domicile of origin can, however, operate crudely, and is 
difficult to defend in modern times.’25 The doctrine can create results that seem highly artificial as it 
may mean that a person is domiciled in a place they left many years ago, or worse, owing to the way 
a domicile of origin is assigned, a place they have never been.26 Though this may have once reflected 
the desires of British colonists who ‘rather like elephants … return to their birthplace to die.’27 It is 
archaic and completely out of touch with today’s migratory world. It also means that the problems 
faced by children of same-sex couples in determining their domicile of origin discussed in the previous 
section, can resurface at a later and maybe, crucial, time in their lives, as it gives the domicile of origin 
a tenacious characteristic not common amongst the other types of domicile.  
This potential for the domicile to resurface despite no real connection was recognised by the Law 
Commission when they set out the below scenario demonstrating such concerns: 
                                                            
23 Such problems include the doctrine of revival connected to the domicile of origin, and its resulting tenacity 
as will be discussed, and the potential for immediate replacement by a domicile of dependency as discussed by 
Carter (n 2) and R Fentiman , ‘Domicile Revisited’ (1991) 50(3) CLJ 445. 
24 Tee v Tee [1973] 3 All ER 1105. 
25 Carter (n 2) above 716. 
26 R Fentiman, ‘Domicile Revisited’ (1991) 50(3) CLJ 445. 
27 Hill & Ni Shuilleabhain (n 6) above 323. 
‘A is born in India to English domiciled parents, and thus receives at birth a domicile in England. 
He remains in India after reaching the age of 16 and acquires a domicile of choice there. Later, 
in middle life, he leaves India intending to settle in the USA. At that point, A’s domicile of 
choice in India ceases and his English domicile revives, although he has never even visited, let 
alone lived in England. If A dies intestate before acquiring a domicile in one of the States of 
the Union, the succession to his moveable estate would be governed by English law.’28 
Similar concerns were raised by Fawcett and Carruthers when they set out a scenario involving X who 
has a domicile of origin in Scotland but lived all of his life in England. Having developed a dislike for 
the UK, X moved to Peru, and having gained a domicile of choice therein remains there for 40 years. 
Having amassed a fortune, X then decides to leave Peru for good and takes up temporary residence in 
New York while he thinks about whether to settle in Virginia or California.29 Fawcett and Carruthers 
then go on to recognise that having abandoned his domicile of choice in Peru, during his period of 
indecisiveness living in New York, a personal law must be applicable to X, and as a result of the doctrine 
of revival it would be Scottish Law.30 Fawcett and Carruthers, go on to recognise the potential impact 
such laws would have on X and his family life: ‘The country that determines his personal law is one 
that he has never visited and for which he feels a repugnance. Nevertheless, if he wishes to marry, his 
capacity will be determined by reference to the law of Scotland.’31 This fails to uphold any policy 
objectives around party expectations, as it seems unlikely that X, or his family would have expected a 
country X had never visited to determine important legal issues. 
The potential for nonsensical decisions are also evidenced in Henwood v Barlow Clowes International 
Ltd.32 In this case, the propositus had a domicile of origin in England, but disliked the country, and so 
moved to the Isle of Man where he set up his business and gained a domicile of choice there. Upon 
the collapse of his business he was ostracised from the community and felt it necessary to move. With 
no desire to return to England he spent most of his time split between a house he owned in France 
and one he rented in Mauritius, yet the court held that his domicile of origin revived and that he was 
domiciled in a place he had actively abandoned many years before and had no intention of returning 
to.  This again is problematic when considering policy objectives like upholding party expectations. It 
also fails to reflect changes in society around migration, as will be discussed below. The US abolished 
the doctrine of revival and replaced it with the rule of continuance,  on the basis of ease and frequency 
of movement around the US,33 however this has also been true of English society for a number of 
years. Whether it be the current ability to move freely around the EU, or seeking visas in search of a 
better life, or to be with spouses abroad, the archaic sentiments of the doctrine of revival are no longer 
reflective of English society, and highlights that the tenacity such a doctrine further promotes in 
relation to the domicile of origin is counter intuitive.  
Problems with the doctrine can also be evidenced by calls for reform in the First Report of the Private 
International Law Committee34 and the Law Commission Working Paper No.88.35 In the former it was 
suggested that a domicile should continue until another domicile is acquired;36 in essence replacing 
                                                            
28 See (n 3) above [5.18], example 1. 
29 J Fawcett, J M Carruthers & Sir P North, Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 14th edn, 2008) 173. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid 174. 
32 [2008] EWCA Civ. 577, [2008] BPIR 778. 
33 Hill & Ni Shúilleabháin (n 6) above 324. 
34 Private International Law Committee, First Report of the Private International Law Committee (Cmd. 9068, 
1954) 
35 See (n 3) above. 
36 See (n 34) above Appendix A. 
the doctrine of revival with a continuance rule. The idea of continuance was then, further explored by 
the Law Commission. Although initially concerned that the Committee had not considered the 
artificiality behind prolonging a connection between a person, and a country which they have 
abandoned, the Commission went on to recognise that this is at least the place with the most recent 
connection, and that imposing the domicile of origin runs the same, if not greater risks, of producing 
results which are artificial: ‘it can be argued that a person is more likely to remain connected to the 
country of his most recent domicile than to his country of birth’.37 With fears around the artificiality 
of suggesting a connection with a country abandoned many years previously, and the recognition that 
the propositus may never have even visited their domicile of origin, the Law Commission suggested a 
move to the rule of continuance.38 Whilst not a perfect rule, such an approach would at least 
guarantee some connection to the most recent country for at least a period of time.   
Additional support for the continuance rule can also be seen in other jurisdictions. For instance, in the 
US in accordance with Re Jones’ Estate,39 New Zealand as a result of section 11 of the Domicile Act 
1976, Australia under section 7 of the Domicile Act 1982 and South Africa as a consequence of section 
3(1) of the Domicile Act 1992. Despite demonstrating clear support for the continuance rule, there is, 
as always the opposing side of the argument. Though recognising some of the artificial results created 
by the doctrine of revival, Fentiman maintains that it has its place within the law,40 citing the ‘footloose 
propositus’41 who has no real connection to a particular place in support of its value. Fentiman asserts 
that ‘what the domicile of origin and the revival doctrine need is careful handling’.42 Previous case law 
demonstrates that careful handling is not used by the judiciary when determining whether the 
domicile of origin should be applied, as demonstrated in cases such as Ramsay v Liverpool Royal 
Infirmary43 and the previously discussed Henwood v Barlow Clowes International Ltd. In both of these 
cases the deceased were found to be domiciled in their domicile of origin despite having left there 
many years previously and had no intention of returning. In Ramsay, the propositus had left Scotland 
to live in Liverpool with his family for the last thirty six years of his life and had even made 
arrangements to be buried in England. Likewise, in Henwood v Barlow Clowes the propositus had, due 
to his dislike for England, left and set up his business in the Isle of Man, before living between 
Mauritius and France. Yet over seventeen years later he was deemed domiciled in England. While the 
judiciary may have had good reason for coming to their conclusions in respect of the outcomes that 
were achieved, for instance in Ramsay it meant that his will that was created in Scotland was valid, 
they certainly do not demonstrate careful handling of the domicile of origin, but instead highlight the 
adhesive nature of the domicile of origin. Likewise, even the most careful of handling does not remove 
the problem of the revival doctrine reinstating a domicile in a country that the person has never visited 
or left many years previously when a propositus elects to abandon their domicile of choice. This is an 
issue with the design of the doctrine, contrasted with societal developments. Careful handling equally 
cannot resolve policy concerns  around party expectations and changing cultural infrastructures, all of 
which would be better provided for under the rule of continuance.   
 
                                                            
37 See (n 3) above [5.20]. 
38 This was then affirmed in the Law Commission’s final report on the matter; Law Commission, Private 
International Law the Law on Domicile Law Com No 168 (1987) [5.25]. 
39 192 Iowa 78; 182 N.W 227 (1921). 
40 Fentiman (n 26) above. 
41 Ibid 452. 
42 Ibid 453. 
43 [1930] A.C. 588 (HL). 
IV. The Domicile of Choice 
 
A domicile of choice is acquired animo et facto, meaning it is acquired by taking up residence in a 
country with the intention of permanently or indefinitely remaining there.44 For the most part the 
residence element is undisputed, as it is not really concerned with the length of residence, but instead, 
the quality of the residence,45 it is the intention element that is often contentious, and is where the 
law lacks clarity. It was even suggested by Lord Chelmsford in Bell v Kennedy that if the animus exists 
before arrival in the country, that ‘any residence, however slight or temporary in its character 
following upon that intention, and in pursuance of it, will be sufficient to establish the domicile.’46 This 
would in turn suggest that what is actually needed is presence in that country, and for the purposes 
of completeness any reform should also address this by replacing ‘residence’ with ‘presence’. Indeed 
such an approach was suggested by Torremans and Fawcett47 and appears to gain support from the 
Law Comnmission48 and in Moor’s J reference to presence in Divall v Divall: ‘The acquisition of a 
domicile of choice … requires physical presence, although it need not be long’.49 This is furthered by 
case law demonstrating that staying with friends50 or in a hotel51 is sufficient to satisfy the factum, as 
the word ‘residence’ has connotations of a period of time and arguably home ownership, or at least 
renting a property. However, whilst ‘presence’ may more accurately reflect judicial attitude in respect 
of the importance attached to the length of time one has been present in a country when determining 
domicile, the use of the word ‘presence’ in the alternative would not reflect the possibility of a person 
being domiciled in a place that they are not physically present in at the time of determination. This 
would for instance apply where a person has multiple residences, domicile would be established in 
their chief residence and may not be where they are at the point of reference.52 On that premise, it is 
thought, that replacing ‘residence’ with ‘presence’ would not be an appropriate reform as it is bereft 
of the needs of the individual cases, whilst residence has wider connotations and is able to be 
stretched more appropriately.53    
A. Satisfying the Requirement of Intention 
 
Common law varies on what is required from an intention to remain permanently, to one to remain 
indefinitely.  In Ramsay v Liverpool Royal Infirmary54  it was made clear that no length of time in itself 
would be sufficient to prove intention, but while the case went on to discuss needing to remain 
permanently,55 in the Estate of Fuld (No 3), Scarman J referred to an intention to remain indefinitely.56 
                                                            
44 Hill & Ni Shúilleabháin (n 6) above 328. 
45 Bell v Kennedy (1868) 6 M. 69 (HL).  
46 Ibid 77. 
47 Paul Torremans (ed), Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law (Oxford University Press, 15th edn, 
2017) 150. 
48 Law Commission, Private International Law the Law on Domicile Law Com No 168 (1987) [5.7]. 
49 Divall v Divall[2014] EWHC 95 (fam) [28]. 
50 Stone v Stone [1958] 1 WLR 1287. 
51 Levene v IRC [1928] A.C. 217 (HL). 
52 Anthony O. Nwafor, ‘The Requisite Intention for the Acquisition of Domicile of Choice: Permanent or 
Indefinite – A Comparative Perspective’ (2013) 21(3) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 
327.  
53 Ibid 336. 
54 [1930] A.C. 588 (HL). 
55 Ibid 588. 
56 In the Estate of Fuld (No 3) [1966] 2 WLR 717, [1968] P. 675, 684. 
In these two cases we can see a shift from ‘permanent’ to ‘indefinite’, however this is dealt with in 
more modern times by referring to an intention to reside ‘permanently or indefinitely’.57 The problem, 
therefore, lies not with that shift, but with the grey area, which may see a propositus with thoughts 
that a move may occur should a particularised event happen.  These vagaries of the law around 
contingencies have been cogently articulated by Scarman J:  
If a man intends to return to the land of his birth upon a clearly foreseen and anticipated 
contingency, e.g. the end of his job, the intention required by law is lacking; but, if he has in 
his mind only a vague possibility, such as making a fortune (a modern example might be 
winning a football pool), or some sentiment about dying in the land of his fathers, such a state 
of mind is consistent with the intention required.58  
This does not deal with those grey areas, as a vague chance of leaving or a ‘pipe dream’59 will not 
prevent a domicile from being acquired, and instead, the contingency must be assessed in order to 
determine whether the intention is satisfied. In addition to such concerns, difficulties may also arise 
as a consequence of the inherent challenges associated with determining a person’s intentions and 
the potential for self-serving declarations of intent. The animus may consequently prove ethereal and 
illusory. 
1. The Contingency 
In the Estate of Re Fuld (No 3) it was considered that a contingency is assessed by asking whether it is 
‘clearly foreseen and reasonably anticipated’.60 Yet, in IRC V Bullock,61 the court held that the 
propositus had not gained a domicile of choice in England as he intended to return to Canada if his 
wife died before him, and they held that there was a ‘sufficiently substantial possibility of the 
contingency happening.’62 In turn, the courts have provided two different tests; A ‘sufficiently 
substantial possibility’ of the contingency, or one that is ‘clearly foreseen and reasonably anticipated’.  
Whilst there may have been a sufficiently substantial possibility that in Bullock his wife would die 
before him, it seems unlikely that he would have reasonably anticipated or expected his wife who was 
three years his junior to die before him.63 Therefore, it is likely that had the test from Fuld’s Estate (No 
3) been applied in Bullock, that the propositus would have been deemed to have gained a domicile of 
choice in England.64 This shows a lack of clarity in the area, and despite the test of ‘clearly foreseen 
and reasonably anticipated’ from Fuld’s Estate being affirmed recently,65 there is still no real certainty 
in the area. The fact that there could be a contingency, and the propositus still gains a domicile of 
choice, would suggest a relaxation in the law from a strict approach of absolute permanency being 
required, but there remains uncertainty surrounding whether contingencies would prevent a change 
in domicile. The law, as it stands, is determined by personal perception, thus providing the judiciary 
with broadened discretion and enhanced flexibility, and individuals with uncertainty and a lack of 
predictability. This uncertainty is problematic for families when considering the areas which may be 
impacted. For instance, given the role of domicile within marriage validity, where a person is domiciled 
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may impact upon whether their marriage is valid which could be of vital importance for migration 
purposes, a party dying intestate or indeed seeking divorce. The law as it stands does not succeed in 
achieving the policy objective of certainty, nor does it reflect the more migratory society, in which it 
is crucial to understand when a contingency may or may not effect a person’s domicile.  
Interestingly, Fawcett66 argues that the rule selection that is able to occur under the present law allows 
the courts to select the domicile that will provide the desired result. He admits that, ‘this could be 
read as an admission of the preparedness to manipulate the facts in order to reach the desired 
result.’67 He states that such discretion and flexibility allows the courts to achieve policy aims, but 
argues that while they may be criticised for doing so, it assists in achieving the correct results. While 
the ‘correct’ result may be the ability to uphold the validity off a marriage or the validity of a will, 
thereby achieving such policy aims, this approach fails to achieve policy objectives around certainty 
and predictability, uniformity of results and upholding party expectations surrounding the country 
they are deemed to be connected to. Therefore, a judge’s thoughts on what the correct outcome is, 
may not necessarily coincide with what others would deem the correct result. Similar concerns are 
also mirrored in the court’s requirement to appropriately assess a person’s intentions. 
2. Determining a Person’s Intention 
Further to the grey areas caused by contingencies, and whether a particular contingency may or may 
not prevent the ascertainment of a domicile of choice, determining a person’s intentions is inherently 
difficult: ‘the ascertainment of a person’s intentions are fraught with difficulty.’68 Assessing what a 
person intended in respect of there permanent living arrangements is not easy, and is often made 
more challenging by the propositus being deceased when the issue arises. However, even in cases 
where a declaration of intention has been provided by the propositus to assist in the determination, 
they are often treated with suspicion due to the advantageous position a person may be in if deemed 
domiciled in a particular place:69  
‘They may be interested statements designed to flatter or deceive the hearer; they may 
represent nothing more than vein expectations unlikely to be fulfilled; and the very facility 
with which they can be made requires their sincerity to be manifested by some active step 
taken in furtherance of the expressed intention.’70  
Where no such declaration is provided, it is for the courts to assess the parties’ intention. As suggested 
above, this is no easy task and it has long been established that in doing so ‘the court must look back 
at the whole of the deceased’s life … to decide whether he had acquired a domicile of choice.’71  It has 
been stressed how essential it is that no act or circumstance in a person’s life should be ignored when 
determining whether they intended to change their domicile72, and that a chronological examination 
of the life should be completed. This stance has, however, been criticised by Carter.73 He states that it 
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produces absurd results and suggests that instead the focus should be on ‘the situation as it existed 
at the very moment in time to which the enquiry relates, and asking directly what was then his home, 
which was the community with which he was then most closely connected, which is the community 
to which it would be most reasonable to say that he then belonged.’74  In addition to Carter’s concerns 
it is propounded that a historic analysis may not be needed in every case, and that such examinations 
are time consuming and thus costly. It is therefore submitted that, whilst focusing on where the 
propositus currently lives, or lived at the time of death, is a useful starting point. It shifts the onus 
away from the more challenging questions of intent and instead focuses on the question of residence 
which can be answered objectively. In the more simple cases this will complement the presumption 
of intent discussed further below, and can be departed from for a more analytical examination in 
appropriate cases, such as those where a propositus has multiple residences or is living in a place for 
a defined period. It is propounded that such an approach offers more cost effective and timely 
solutions in appropriate cases whilst providing the ability for much deeper analysis as set out in 
previous case law in the more complex decisions..  
3. Creating A Presumption? 
One of the strengths of domicile as a connecting factor is that it looks to the person’s intentions, as 
opposed to establishing more tenuous links, such as those used within habitual residence,75 but it is 
that element of intention that is in much need of reform. The reform needs to address the concerns 
raised above around a propositus having a contingency which may, upon its happening, cause them 
to leave, and whether this prevents a domicile of choice from being acquired, alongside  the natural 
difficulties with determining what a person intended. It is, however, important that any such 
reforms are policy sensitive by creating  greater certainty in the law, as opposed to providing further 
discretion for the courts. This need for certainty was also identified in the First Report of the Law 
Committee76 and the Law Commission Working Paper No 88,77 as both recommended reform within 
the area. The Committee made the point that they are aware that the courts have had a tendency to 
apply a more modern and less strict approach to the cases, but asserts that the law is in need of 
amendment. They suggest a proposal in which presumptions of intent form part of the suggested 
legislation. The key presumption suggested is that, ‘Where a person has his home in a country, he 
shall be presumed to live there permanently.’78 The Law Commission, on the other hand, suggested 
that when a person has been habitually resident for seven continuous years since reaching the age 
of sixteen, they will be presumed to be intending to make it their home indefinitely, unless evidence 
is shown to the contrary.79   
In considering the route to reform, the Law Commission took issue with the Committee’s presumption 
of intent on the basis that ‘home’ would be no easier to resolve than an investigation into where a 
person is domiciled.80 This statement is contentious. Admittedly, an investigation would have to be 
undertaken to determine where a person had his ‘home’ however, ‘home’ is a concept that is 
understood by the layman, lawyers and society as a whole and has in fact been utilised successfully in 
other areas of law. For example, Article 8 of the ECHR refers to ‘home’ and has been recognised and 
understood within case law dealing with Convention matters.81 There is also domestic support for the 
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use of the term ‘home’ in housing legislation82 which has again been interpreted and understood even 
where there has been multiple homes.83 For that reason, the use of the term ‘home’ by the Law 
Committee is not as problematic as has been suggested, and is something many people would be able 
to understand and predict.  
Instead, the Commission suggested a presumption of intent where there has been habitual residence 
for seven continuous years, though this is also open to criticism. Like ‘home’, a person’s place of 
‘habitual residence’ would have to be investigated, and it is a term that is not used as widely by 
laymen, as ‘home’ is popular everyday terminology. When considering habitual residence as an 
alternative to domicile, it has been argued to be an underdeveloped concept that ‘has proved to be a 
source of uncertainty’.84 Though developments have continued since Carter’s criticisms, and cases 
surrounding the meaning of habitual residence have come before the Supreme Court,85 this focus has  
predominantly been around the habitual residence of children. The reality of determining habitual 
residence is that the meaning of habitual residence varies according to the context86 and that the 
habitual residence of an adult under domestic law still comes back to the test set out in Shah v Barnet 
London Borough Council.87 The test in Shah requires the concurrence of residence and a ‘settled 
purpose’ of remaining there, which may not always be easy to apply, and has been pulled in different 
directions by differing case facts.88 With the requirement to have habitual residence in the said place 
for seven continuous years, the proposal appears arbitrary, burdensome and incompatible with the 
more modern approach to habitual residence. When analysing the reason behind the seven years it 
would seem there is little justification for this figure and it could be said to be onerous. It is significantly 
higher than the three month requirement under the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment Order 2001,89 
which is used when determining domicile under the Brussels I Regulations, for jurisdictional purposes. 
The Commission believed it to be about the right balance but has admitted that there is ‘no magic in 
seven years’.90  
The presumption proposal by the Commission lacks thorough forethought and proper consideration. 
These particular problems are highlighted by Carter, who criticises the proposal for the time scale not 
commencing until the propositus attains the age of sixteen, as this could mean that whilst a person 
has been living in a particular country since they were twelve, they will not be presumed to have the 
intention to live their indefinitely until they reach the age of twenty three, an onerous hurdle to 
jump.91 He also questions the age of sixteen on the premise that if a child can be found criminally 
responsible and able to have intent in relation to criminal proceedings from the age of ten, it seems 
illogical to state they cannot form intention regarding where they wish to live until six years later. He 
goes on to stress that the fact that in most cases a child may not be able to carry out his intentions is 
besides the point.92 Finally, Carter states that there is a lack of clarity in what is meant by ‘subject to 
evidence to the contrary’. He questions the amount of evidence required and whether the 
presumption is one of fact or law.93 These are interesting arguments, and it is clearly problematic to 
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think that a domicile of choice would not, under the Commission’s proposal, be presumed to apply 
until the adult reaches the age of twenty three. If a child moved to the country in question at the age 
of thirteen, while they may not have had the ability to carry out an alternative intention at that age, 
only a few years later this would be possible. The very fact that they then continue to live there surely 
demonstrates that they then have an intention to remain there, and so it means that the decision not 
to have the clock start ticking from when they moved there seem illogical. This problem also adds to 
the criticism that a seven year period is too onerous given that it means a presumption can never 
apply to those under the age of twenty three. Lastly, it ignores Article 12 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child by simply casting aside the views of the child, and the mature 
thoughts they may have on where they intend to live.94 
With careful consideration of the precise nature of any presumptions of intent, it is apparent that the 
use of a presumption would, in many cases, eliminate the inherent difficulty of trying to decipher a 
person’s intentions, and, could also prevent historical examinations of a person’s life which can lead 
to lengthy and expensive court cases. As a presumption rather than a rule, it would also mean that it 
could be rebutted, allowing for the chronological analysis of a propositus’ life where necessary, and 
could be used in tandem with a set rule on contingencies, such as the one in Re Fuld’s Estate. This 
approach would better handle a more migratory society by providing certainty, and allowing for 
resolutions outside the courtroom in the more straightforward cases, but leaving a mechanism for 
adversarial challenge when needed. For that reason presumptions of intent will be a consideration 
when proposing reform.  
 
B. Changing One’s Domicile, but to what Standard of Proof? 
 
At present, any assertions of a change in domicile must be proved by the person asserting it. The 
general rule is that it must be proved on a balance of probabilities; thus the civil standard, however, 
such a statement is contentious. When looking at cases such as Ramsay v Liverpool Royal Infirmary 
and Winans v AG  the propositus’ had left their domicile of origin many years previously but were still 
held to be domiciled there. Furthermore, it has been stated in some cases that a higher standard of 
proof is needed, something ‘beyond a mere balance of probabilities’.95 This higher standard of proof 
has pertained to a change from a domicile of origin, to one of choice,96 and further demonstrates the 
tenacity of the domicile of origin discussed earlier. This tenacity is as a result of some members of the 
judiciary perceiving the domicile of origin to have more paramountcy than its counterparts: ‘it is easier 
to show change from one domicile of choice to another domicile of choice than it is to show a change 
to a domicile of choice from a domicile of origin.’97 This approach was disapproved of in Henwood v 
Barlow Clowes, and the normal civil standard was held to apply but, ‘tradition dies hard’98 and there 
are clear contrasts in the standard that has been applied. This is problematic when the aim of this 
reform is to provide certainty for couples and to ensure their expectations are upheld. 
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In providing a holistic reformulation of the law on domicile, it is imperative that the standard of proof 
required when asserting a change or rebutting a presumption is covered. This is supported by the Law 
Commission who in their suggestion for reform provided that, the normal civil standard of proof; the 
balance of probabilities should apply to all domicile disputes.99 This article will, therefore, in its 
suggestion for reform, propose a fixed rule stating that it is the balance of probabilities to ensure  
certainty and consistency in respect of the standard of proof that must be met when alleging a change 
of domicile.  Enforcing the civil standard will not only reflect more recent case law such as Kenwood v 
Barlow Clowes, but will, alongside other changes help thwart the judiciaries’ overuse of the domicile 
of origin.  
 




In accordance with the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, children under the age of 16 
have a domicile of dependency.100 As with the rules of a domicile of origin, a legitimate child’s domicile 
of dependency follows that of their father, and an illegitimate child that of their mother. In an attempt 
to create greater flexibility, section 4 of that same Act states that where the parents are living apart 
and the child has a home with the mother and not with the father, the child will take the mother’s 
domicile. The use of ‘living apart’ means that the parents need not be separated, they may be living 
apart for other reasons such as work. This provides a step in the right direction  in beginning to reflect 
some of the more modern familial arrangements, yet it still appears artificial.101 The Act does not 
consider the position when the father is dead, nor does it apply equally to the domicile of origin. 
Therefore, a child may still have a domicile of origin in a country with which they have no connection, 
and may, as mentioned earlier, immediately have their domicile of origin replaced by a domicile of 
dependency. This would suggest that in such situations the domicile of origin’s only role is to lay in 
abeyance for the purpose of the doctrine of revival, a doctrine which has already been criticised for 
being outdated and no longer fit for purpose. With the desire to tackle some of this artificiality, the 
Law Commission recommended reform in the area.102   
The suggested reform was that where a child’s parents have the same domicile it will change with 
them, but where they have different domiciles, but live together, that the child’s should change with 
that of the mother. Then when considering when the child has a home with one of the parents the 
domicile is the same as, and changes with that parent. As with the domicile of origin, there is again no 
provision for a child of a same-sex couple. These recommendations were altered in the Law 
Commission’s final report.103 The Commission introduced the idea of the child’s domicile being 
determined by looking at the place they are most closely connected with, thereby focusing more on 
the child and their connections, rather than viewing the child solely through the lens of the parent’s 
domicile, albeit aided by presumptions. These presumptions were based on the parent or parents the 
child lives with, and their domiciles: so for instance where the child lives with both parents, and they 
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both have the same domicile, there will be a rebuttable presumption that the child is most closely 
connected to that place, and therefore domiciled there.104 Alternatively, where the child lives with 
both parents, but they have different domiciles, no presumption should be applied, and instead the 
test of closest connection should be applied solely.105 The report never materialised within the law in 
England, as it was rejected by the UK Government,106 but it is possible to see how such 
recommendations in their avoidance of stipulating the mother or father’s domicile, could offer the 
versatility needed in the modern day to ensure the law on domicile reflects legal developments around 
same-sex relationships.  
When analysing the potential for success of such a reform, the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 offers 
vital insight. Though not introduced in its entirety, or in the exact manner set out in the Law 
Commission report, similarities can be seen between the report and section 22 of the Act in relation 
to the domicile of dependency. Section 22 provides that where the parents of the child are domiciled 
in the same country as each other, and the child has a home with a parent or a home/homes with 
both of them, the child shall be domiciled in the same country as their parents. Alternatively, under 
section 22(3), where the child does not have a home with their parents, or their parents are not 
domiciled in the same country as each other, the child shall be domiciled in the country which the 
child has, for the time being, the closest connection. The key difference between the legislation and 
the Law Commission recommendations in their final report, is the use of a rules based approach where 
there is a common parental domicile, as opposed to the presumption that was recommended.  On 
paper this may not appear a dramatic shift, but it could make an important distinction in practice. 
With a rule in place, a child’s domicile is wherever their parent’s are domiciled at that time, regardless 
of whether the child is living, or, has ever lived, in that country; it keeps in place the ability for domicile 
to work in a more arbitrary way. On the other hand, the use of the presumption allows the courts to 
avoid such arbitrary decisions in the rarer, more complex cases.107 It is therefore important, when 
proposing any reforms within the domicile of dependency, that they are not only inclusive of the 
various modern family makeups, such as those where parents are of the same-sex or whereby the 
children are living with their father and not with their mother, but that they also operate in the most 
appropriate way; lessons should be learned from the old before developing the new.  
In addition to the aforementioned proposals, the Law Commission in both the initial consultation 
document,108 and their final report,109 expressed that there was no desirable reason to keep the two 
categories of domicile for children, and that it had only been necessary for the purposes of the 
doctrine of revival, which they had recommended be abolished. Consequently, they also 
recommended the abolition of the domicile of origin. In making such recommendations, the Law 
Commission recognised that the rules they were proposing worked for children right from birth, up 
until the ability to acquire a domicile of choice. Such a reform, further to being relevant to other 
concerns around the domicile of origin’s tenacity, and the difficulties in gaining a domicile of choice, 
would also address the criticism that a domicile of origin can, at present, be immediately replaced by 
a domicile of dependency. Likewise, with the right measures in place for determining a child’s domicile 
of dependency, problems currently faced by children of same-sex couples would be removed from the 
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outset, as would the potential for their unascertainable domicile to revive at a later, and potentially 
crucial time of their lives.  
 
B. Mental Capacity 
 
In addition to children, those with a mental incapacity to form the necessary intent required for a 
domicile of choice, are also assigned a domicile of dependency. Their domicile remains the same as it 
was immediately before becoming impaired.110 The Law Commission recommended reform on the 
basis that the domicile be based on the country which they are most closely connected to,111 however, 
this could mean that a propositus was deemed to be domiciled in a country they never intended to 
live in, but may have been moved there by a carer. For that reason, it is submitted  that the law as it 
stands is the best provision for those not able to form the necessary intention, as at least a connection 
to that country or state can be seen prior to the mental impairment.  Consequently, reform is deemed 
unnecessary  within this aspect of the domicile of dependency. 
 
 
VI. Domicile: the Plan for Reform 
 
Analysis of the law on domicile leads to a clarion call for reform. The areas of main concern surround 
the doctrine of revival in relation to the domicile of origin, the rules to determine a child’s domicile, 
and the intention element of the domicile of choice. This section will critically evaluate how each of 
these should be reformed.  
Turning first to the doctrine of revival of the domicile of origin. It is evident from analysis of case law 
and academic comment herein, that it can produce artificial results, and as a concept is outdated: ‘In 
the modern world, where people are much more ready to cut all ties to their country of birth, it is no 
longer justified to resort to the domicile of origin to fill a gap between two domiciles of choice.’112 For 
some, they may have left their domicile of origin many years prior, and others may have never even 
visited, making the doctrine of revival somewhat illogical. It is, therefore, submitted, that the doctrine 
of revival should be abolished and replaced by the continuance rule. This would mean that a previous 
domicile of choice would continue until a new one had been acquired. Such reform was suggested by 
the Law Commission in the previous century,113 and this author argues that such reformulation is 
therefore not only supported, but its need is ever greater, given the continuous growth of 
international families and migration since that time.   
When analysing the way in which a domicile of origin is assigned, it is apparent that children of same-
sex couples were not in contemplation when the rules were formulated. The continuation of gender 
based rules, however, now fail to reflect the rights obtained by same-sex couples, and are 
discriminatory towards such couples in their roles as parents, and their children, in not providing a 
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way in which they can be assigned a domicile, making reform a necessity. Furthermore, while the 
general rules around domicile of origin and domicile of dependency are the same, the Domicile and 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 can lead to some children having a domicile of origin in one place, 
to which they have no connection, which is then immediately replaced by a domicile of dependency 
in another, with the domicile of origin merely laying in waiting for the purpose  of revival. This, in 
addition to the problems faced by children of same-sex couples in determining their domicile of origin 
demonstrates the need for reform for two reasons. Firstly, to address the potential artificiality created 
by the current rules, and secondly, with the above proposal for the abolition of the doctrine of revival, 
there is no distinction between the domicile of origin and the domicile of dependency. Instead, upon 
the abolition of the doctrine of revival, the domicile of origin should also be removed, and focus should 
turn to assessing the appropriate rules for determining a child’s domicile. While this research offers 
an original insight into the problems faced by children of same-sex couples, and therefore intensifies 
the need for change, other more long-standing problems with the law around the domicile of origin 
and the doctrine of revival remain relevant today, and have been discussed to further support the 
need for change. Such need for change was also recognised by the Law Commission, 114 and though 
they were not in contemplation of the legal developments around same-sex relationships, it 
demonstrates support for the reforms proposed herein. 
In establishing the optimal rules for the allocation of a child’s domicile, it is important that the rules 
do not repeat the problems caused by the utilisation of the current gender based roles of mother and 
father. Instead, any rules must be inclusive of various familial arrangements, and lead to a domicile 
that best reflects the child’s actual connection to a country, whilst still providing certainty wherever 
possible. It is therefore propounded that the most suitable solution would be based on determining 
the country to which the child is most closely connected, assisted by a presumption in certain 
circumstances, as advocated in the Law Commission’s final report.115 This would mean that the general 
rule was that a child is domiciled in the country with which they have the closest connection. Running 
alongside the rule, it is proposed that there would be rebuttable presumptions for some of the less 
complex cases. These cases would be where the parents are domiciled in the same country and the 
child has a home with either or both of them. In such cases the child will be presumed to be most 
closely connected to their country of domicile unless evidence to the contrary is shown.116 Likewise, 
where the parents are not domiciled in the same country as one another, and the child has their home 
with one of them, it will be presumed that the child is most closely connected to the country in which 
the parent they have a home with is domiciled, unless evidence to the contrary is shown.117 In all other 
instances, such as where the parents have different domiciles and the child lives with them both, no 
presumption will apply, and instead the country of closet connection would need to be established,118 
taking into consideration all of the circumstances of the case. The Law Commission were of the opinion 
that the test and presumptions, as laid out, were suitable for determining a child’s domicile from birth 
right up until the age of sixteen,119 and while it differs to the way the law was implemented in Scotland, 
it is argued that the fixed rules used in section 22 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 still has the 
potential to create arbitrary results in cases when they could be avoided.  
In addressing the requisite intention to establish a domicile of choice, judicial comment highlights that 
there is a grey area when determining whether a particular contingency, that would make a propositus 
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leave the country in question, will prevent a domicile of choice from being acquired. Furthermore, 
difficulties arise as a result of the tenacity of the domicile of origin as identified in cases such as 
Ramsay, and the inherent challenges of ascertaining a person’s intentions, thus reform by way of 
presumptions is proposed. Like the Private International Law Committee, it is promulgated that there 
be a rebuttable presumption of ‘where a person has his home in a country, he shall be presumed to 
live there permanently’.120 In suggesting this as an appropriate reform, it is recognised that this is not 
without its own challenges. In the straightforward cases of domicile, a presumption is unlikely to be 
needed as it will be apparent where a person has his permanent home, and in the more complex cases, 
despite there being a presumption, it is more likely that a rebuttal will be raised, thereby leading to 
the same point of contention within court.  
Regardless, it is opined that such a reformulation still holds merit. In the more straightforward cases 
it will encourage a move away from the archaic position of the tenacity of the domicile of origin, which 
is still evidenced in court discussion in recent times,121 whilst also tackling the potential problem of 
the courts being able to determine domicile so as to achieve a particular result, as may have been the 
case in Ramsay. This may in turn lead to more consistency within the area, as the presumption would 
require a rebuttal if the propositus is no longer living in their domicile of origin in order to state they 
are still domiciled there. Likewise, this would also mean that in cases that seem more straightforward, 
but are still litigious, the presumption would switch the burden of proof, again acting as a barrier to 
old habits of applying the law of the domicile of origin. Meanwhile, in the more complex cases, or 
those which involve more frequent relocation, although the presumption would not provide an easy 
decision for the courts, it would provide a clear starting point, again providing some clarity and 
consistency for the courts.  
Though some of these problems around the tenacity of the domicile of origin might be addressed by 
the abolition of the domicile of origin as a distinct category of domicile, it must be accepted that such 
proposals may not be heeded, and thus for a reformulation to be as effective as possible regardless of 
the existence of the domicile of origin, the presumption plays an important role. Furthermore, the use 
of a presumption would also appropriately address the problems encountered as a result of vague or 
uncertain contingencies by presuming there is an intention to remain, in addition to tackling the 
inherent problems with attempts to determine a person’s intentions. For instances where evidence 
will be shown to the contrary, the legislation should also state that in respect of a contingency it is the 
‘clearly foreseen and reasonably anticipated’ test from Re Fuld’s Estate, and the standard of proof 
required is the civil standard regardless of the domicile being replaced; preventing a heavier burden 
being applied to the domicile of origin in the event that it is not abolished as a separate domicile.  
 
VII. An Alternative to Domicile? 
 
A. Habitual Residence 
 
When considering how the law on domicile might be reformed to ensure it reflects modern society 
and achieves policy objectives, it is pertinent to analyse whether domicile as a connecting factor ought 
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to be abolished, and instead replaced by a more appropriate option.122 As a consequence of its 
resounding use within the conflict of laws, the primary connecting factor that will be considered is 
habitual residence. The concept was initially developed  by the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law,123 and is now used within domestic legislation124 as well as being the main 
connecting factor in EU Regulations such as Brussels II bis,125 Rome I126 and Rome II.127 It was also 
considered as an alternative to reforming the law on domicile by the Law Commission, and despite 
their conclusions that habitual residence was unsuitable for general choice of law purposes,128 the 
possible advantages and disadvantages of the connecting factor will be analysed to determine 
whether that conclusion is still accurate over 3 decades later, baring in mind societal developments.  
One of the primary threads running throughout this article has been the fact that we have become a 
more migratory society, and the need for the law on domicile to reflect this factorisation. Currently, 
the difficulties in changing a domicile to one of choice, and the doctrine of revival are not consistent 
with this element of modern society and may be an area that would benefit from the use of habitual 
residence. Habitual residence under domestic law, requires the concurrence of physical residence and 
the mental state of having a ‘settled purpose’ of remaining there.129 A ‘settled purpose’ need not mean 
permanent or indefinite, and can be satisfied by planning to stay for a fixed period of time130 examples 
might include residence for the purposes of a fixed term contract131 or a period of study.132 Without 
the focus on a person staying in the country permanently, habitual residence may offer a test that 
better reflects the increased mobility across the likes of the EU133 and provide people with a 
connecting factor that better suits a more transient lifestyle rather than clinging onto a connection 
they may have had to a place many years ago. Furthermore, with less focus on the subjective element 
of intent, and a greater interest in the objective fact of residence,134 habitual residence may sidestep 
the difficulties previously discussed in relation to determining a person’s intentions when assessing 
whether a domicile of choice has been ascertained. It would, therefore seem, that habitual residence 
may offer an approach that can provide greater certainty by avoiding a heavy focus on a person’s 
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intentions, which has been identified as challenging, whilst being better equipped for a more fluid 
society.  
It has also been suggested, that the more factual decision described above, rather than the legally 
complex rules seen within domicile allow for a more pragmatic and common sense based approach.135 
Finally, with its prominent use in a number of other jurisdictions, particularly across the EU, adopting 
habitual residence as England’s connecting factor, and abolishing domicile could provide a greater 
uniformity in our judicial decisions. In removing domicile as the connecting factor in areas such as 
marriage validity, succession and jurisdiction in divorce, people moving in and out of England would 
have greater consistency in the law applied to them, which may in turn satisfy the policy objective of 
greater certainty.  
Advantageous as the above may seem, habitual residence is not without its faults. Though a lesser 
focus on the subjective element of intent may make changing one’s domicile easier, in addition to 
making the determination of a person’s habitual residence easier than that of determining domicile, 
the route is not problem free. Without the role of intention, habitual residence as a connecting factor 
could be based on tenuous links: ‘the subjective arguments of a lack of connection with the country 
or a wish to leave will not prevent habitual residence from being acquired.’136 This can be evidenced 
in cases such as Re B137 in which the family’s intention when moving to Germany in an attempt to 
resolve their differences was to ‘wait and see’ resulted in them being deemed habitually resident there 
after only six months, and more shockingly in cases such as M v M138 and Re A139 where families were 
there not through choice, but necessity caused by financial and work commitments. This problem was 
also recognised by the Law Commission in their assessment of habitual residence as a replacement 
for domicile, and formed part of the reason for setting the idea of replacement aside.140 With a 
difficulty to ‘identify a really settled purpose to remain in a country, the habitual residence so found 
has an air of artificiality.’141 Amidst these precarious links it is difficult to suggest that habitual 
residence would, as an alternative to domicile, fulfil policy objectives such as certainty and upholding 
party expectations, in fact it has the potential to do the exact opposite.  
Likewise, whilst Zhang recognised that the lack of definition of habitual residence within the Hague 
Convention allowed the courts to make factual decisions based on individual cases,142 it leaves the 
position surrounding ascertaining a person’s habitual residence vague and uncertain. While residence 
is required and appears to be the focal point when determining habitual residence, the length of 
residence required is unclear, and in some cases contradictory. For example, in Re F,143 it was 
suggested that a month may be deemed an appreciable period of time, which was supported in 
Marinos v Marinos in which is was recognised that weeks rather than months was sufficient,144 
however, in A v A (Child Abduction)145 eight months was considered insufficient. ‘There are obviously 
deeper unexpressed considerations at work that might explain the more contradictory cases’,146 
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however this demonstrates that the law on habitual residence is far from problem free. When shorter 
periods of residence present themselves, the parties intentions have an enhanced influence in 
establishing habitual residence, arguably depriving habitual residence of its factual focus, and the 
associated advantages.147 Similarly, though habitual residence is used in other jurisdictions, which was 
thought to lead to greater consistency and certainty for couples, particularly as they moved across the 
EU, this is not the case. Aside from the domicile of children which England has harmonised inline with 
the EU test,148 the application of habitual residence varies depending upon its context. Under EU law, 
habitual residence has an autonomous meaning, however this meaning can change depending upon 
the EU instrument and context. Thus, the Borras Report that acts as an explanatory report on the 
Brussels II Convention sets out what is meant by habitual residence, and case law within particular 
areas has built on this.149  England then has its own understanding of habitual residence under 
domestic law, which varies to that of the EU, and can result in a person having more than one habitual 
residence at any one time unlike the EU concept.150  Again, this appears to counter any suggestions 
that the adoption of habitual residence over domicile would provide greater unity in decisions and 
consistency for people crossing state borders. Notwithstanding suggestions that habitual residence 
bears the same meaning in all cases, ‘on further inspection it becomes apparent that habitual 
residence is not so uncomplicated.’151 This all highlights that actually employing habitual residence in 
place of domicile may not remove some of the problems faced, they are simply veiled.  
As suggested above, in accordance with domestic law, it is possible for a person to be habitually 
resident in two places at the same time. For jurisdictional purposes this may not prove problematic as 
the court of either jurisdiction would be able to hear the case, however, it would cause much greater 
difficulties in instances of choice of law that require a determination of the applicable law and should 
be predictable ahead of litigation.152 A similar problem can also arise due to the potential gaps in 
habitual residence. Without the doctrine of revival or something akin to the rule of continuance it is 
possible that having abandoned one habitual residence, a propositus may have a period without a 
habitual residence before settling in a new country. Such a situation would not only be problematic 
for choice of law purposes, if no court is able to claim jurisdiction ‘the claimant cannot vindicate his 
rights and the defendant can act with impunity.’153 
It is, therefore, apparent that the law on habitual residence is no quick fix to overcome the issues with 
domicile as a connecting factor. Regardless of its merit, the disadvantages in its use demonstrate that 
it cannot and should not be used to replace domicile. Its tenuous links, potential gaps, or the ability to 
have multiple residences, alongside the lack of stable definition and clarity mean that it would not 
always provide the certainty sought or meet party expectations. Like the Law Commission, it is 
concluded that ‘domicile if amended… is better suited … than is habitual residence.’154 It is time to 
recognise that both connecting factors have their place within English Private International law rules. 
Domicile plays an important role and over three decades on, and countless changes in law and society, 
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it is time reform was actioned to make the connecting factor of domicile fit for purpose, rather than 




Having considered habitual residence in some detail, nationality as the ‘longstanding test of 
“belonging”’155 to a country in most civil law countries will, also be briefly analysed. Like habitual 
residence, the Law Commission also considered whether nationality could replace domicile as a 
connecting factor.156 In concluding that it could not, the Law Commission recognised that problems 
mays arise where a person is stateless or has dual nationality, and would be particularly problematic 
in a composite state like the UK, as further rules would be needed to connect a person to a particular 
country within the overarching group of states.157 Moreover, given the concerns raised in relation to 
domicile’s suitability in a migratory society due to current difficulties in establishing a domicile of 
choice, nationality would not offer an enhanced position in this regard. Whilst changing one’s 
nationality cannot be done without the individual and the state’s permission, which provides a degree 
of certainty that is beneficial,158 it also creates inflexibility which is problematic particularly in a 
migratory society. Similarly to the criticism levelled at the tenacity of the domicile of origin, it can 
mean that a person continues to be subject to the laws of a country they left many years ago if they 
have failed to become naturalised in the country they have been residing in. It fails to cater for an 
individual’s wishes159 and in turn, party expectations. It is therefore submitted that despite its use in 
England in some choice of law rules160 and the degree of certainty it offers, the additional rules it 
would need to operate in the UK and the lack of flexibility it would offer in a society where the demand 
for such flexibility has risen, means that nationality is not appropriate as a replacement for domicile. 




Domicile, as the preferred connecting factor in matters of personal status in England and Wales plays 
an important role in the law, but it is an area of law that has been subject to neglect. Though calls for 
reform were made in the last millennium, they have gone unheeded. In the time that has lapsed, the 
problems have been added to by further developments within the law, making reform now a necessity 
to ensure compliance with human rights principles on non-discrimination. With children of same-sex 
couples unprovided for by the current rules for assigning a person’s domicile of origin, a complete 
recast of the law on domicile is propounded as the appropriate response, as opposed to reform on a 
piecemeal basis. The problems faced by children of same-sex couples, brings the inadequacies within 
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the law on domicile out of the shadows of private international law, and reigniting the need for reform 
in this area.   
In considering legal and societal developments such as recognised same-sex relationships and the 
increased desire and ease to move from one country to another, this article offers new insights and 
motive for reforming the law on domicile. The proposed reforms around the creation of new rules for 
establishing the domicile of a child, replacing the doctrine of revival with the continuance rule, and 
creating presumptions of intention reflect those developments, and the relevant public policies 
around certainty and party expectations. In doing so, this article offers a new and distinctive 
contribution to the debate on domicile. Furthermore, in order to appropriately conclude that the 
reform proposed offers the most pertinent solution, habitual residence and nationality as alternatives 
to domicile are also considered. However, concerns around tenuous links, long forgotten countries of 
nationality, multiples residencies and dual nationality, and the potential for gaps in residency 
demonstrate that habitual residence or nationality alone, could not ensure certainty and the meeting 
of party expectations when determining the applicable law. Though both options have their place as  
connecting factors within rules on private international law,161 so too does a reformulated domicile. It 
is therefore promulgated, that the law on domicile should be reformed in accordance with the 
proposals contained herein to ensure that when called upon, domicile can appropriately, and in line 
with modern developments connect a person to a country.   
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